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Abstract 
Self-continuity—the sense that one’s past, present, and future are meaningfully connected—
is considered a defining feature of personal identity. However, bases of self-continuity may 
depend on cultural beliefs about personhood. In multilevel analyses of data from 7,287 adults 
from 55 cultural groups in 33 nations, we tested a new tripartite theoretical model of bases of 
self-continuity. As expected, perceptions of stability, sense of narrative, and associative links 
to one’s past each contributed to predicting the extent to which people derived a sense of self-
continuity from different aspects of their identities. Ways of constructing self-continuity were 
moderated by cultural and individual differences in mutable (vs. immutable) personhood 
beliefs—the belief that human attributes are malleable. Individuals with lower mutability 
beliefs based self-continuity more on stability; members of cultures where mutability beliefs 
were higher based self-continuity more on narrative. Bases of self-continuity were also 
moderated by cultural variation in contextualized (vs. decontextualized) personhood beliefs, 
indicating a link to cultural individualism-collectivism. Our results illustrate the cultural 
flexibility of the motive for self-continuity.  
 
Keywords: Identity, Culture, Self-Continuity, Mutability, Personhood Beliefs, Mindset 
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Being Oneself Through Time:  
Bases of Self-Continuity Across 55 Cultures  
Self-continuity can be defined as the sense that past, present, and future time-slices of 
one’s identity are meaningfully connected. Philosophers (Taylor, 1989; Wiggins, 2001), as 
well as both classic (Erikson, 1968; James, 1892) and contemporary (Chandler, Lalonde, 
Sokol, & Hallett, 2003; Vignoles, Sani, Easterbrook, & Cvetkovska, 2017) psychologists, 
portray self-continuity as a defining feature of personal identity. Both personal and societal 
functioning arguably depend on people’s forming identities that are seen to persist over 
time—not just from past to present but also into the future. Without self-continuity, people 
could not learn from experience, be held accountable for their past actions, make plans for 
their future, nor cooperate with others in the present to secure future benefits.  
During the life-course, however, people experience physical, psychological and social 
changes, and neither past nor future selves can be directly experienced in the present. Hence, 
people’s sense of being the same person through time is not a given, but must be actively 
constructed—and both individuals and cultural groups may prioritize different bases of self-
continuity within identity construction (Chandler et al., 2003). In the current paper, we 
examine the role of cultural and personal beliefs about personhood in moderating the ways in 
which people construct their personal sense of self-continuity. 
Self-Continuity and its Bases 
Motivated Identity Construction Theory (Vignoles, 2011) portrays self-continuity as a 
core identity motive. The theory states that people strive to construct and maintain a sense of 
self-continuity, and that succeeding in this task may have important implications for personal 
and societal well-being. Studies have shown evidence that individuals strive to achieve and 
maintain a sense of self-continuity (Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, & Arndt, 2015; 
Shrauger, 1975; Troll & Skaff, 1997; Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006; 
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Vignoles, Manzi, Regalia, Jemmolo, & Scabini, 2008), and that deficits or threats to self-
continuity are associated with negative personal and societal outcomes, including low self-
esteem, dissociation, negative intergroup attitudes, and suicidality (Ball & Chandler, 1989; 
Lampinen, Odegard, & Leding, 2004; Rosenberg, 1986; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015).   
People may construct a sense of self-continuity in different ways. Focusing on past-
to-present continuity, Chandler and colleagues (2003) proposed and found that “continuity 
warrants”—the reasons that people gave when asked explicitly to justify their self-
continuity—could be classified into two different ‘streams’, which they called ‘essentialist’ 
and ‘narrativist’. Essentialist strategies involved emphasizing stability of the self over time, 
by either trivializing, or denying, change (see also Ross, 1989). Chandler et al. related these 
strategies to the belief that a person has an underlying and fixed essence, a “true nature”. 
However, they proposed that individuals can construct their sense of self-continuity 
alternatively through developing narratives that account for change. Through narratives, 
people can connect different parts of their past and tell the story of how they became who 
they are in the present, adopting narrative devices such as causal progressions and turning 
points to make sense of change and instability within a single storyline (see also Hammack, 
2008; McAdams, 2011; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007).  
Both stability and narrative might be used to form reasoned arguments for one’s self-
continuity. However, people may also bolster their sense of self-continuity on a more implicit 
and intuitive level, without engaging in explicit reasoning. Sedikides et al. (2015) showed 
that feelings of nostalgia for one’s past can increase self-continuity, and that people may 
compensate for discontinuities by using nostalgia to restore self-continuity. Research has also 
suggested that people use cherished possessions to bolster self-continuity, especially during 
major life-transitions (Habermas & Paha, 2002; Kroger & Adair, 2008). Without resorting to 
explicit reasoning about stability or storylines, people seemingly can derive a sense of self-
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continuity from thoughts, feelings, actions or objects that remind them of, or make them feel 
close to, their past selves. Hence, Vignoles et al. (2017) proposed a third basis for self-
continuity, beyond stability and narrative: associative links to one’s past. They argued that a 
single basis, or any combination of the three, could be used to achieve a sense of self-
continuity. Theoretically, the three bases might contradict each other (e.g., a story of how one 
has changed contradicts the belief that one has been stable) and they might substitute for each 
other (e.g., attachment to an object that reminds one of one’s childhood might compensate for 
catastrophic change or for a broken narrative). Use of the three bases would depend on their 
contextual availability as well as individuals’ beliefs and cognitive styles.  
All three bases may underlie experiences of self-continuity not just from past to 
present but also into the future. Attributes that have remained stable in the past—especially if 
linked to belief in an unchanging essence—may be projected onto the future self. Significant 
self-narratives will often extend beyond the present, encompassing future goals or 
expectations. Objects or memories that make people feel close to their past self are likely to 
be cherished and preserved into the future. Indeed, there is evidence that past-to-present and 
present-to-future continuity are positively correlated (Sokol & Eisenheim, 2016). Although 
individuals may differ in levels of past-, present- or future-orientation (Zimbardo & Boyd, 
1999), neurological and clinical studies reveal substantial overlap between the neural 
substrates of memory and imagining the future (El Haj, Antoine, & Kapogiannis, 2015; 
Schacter et al., 2012), and patterns of past and future self-continuity show similar trends over 
the life-span (Rutt & Löckenhoff, 2016). Moreover, experimentally induced nostalgia for 
one’s past fosters greater optimism for one’s future (Cheung et al., 2013), whereas a lack of 
past-to-present self-continuity is associated with suicidality—implying an ultimate level of 
disregard for one’s future self (Ball & Chandler, 1987; Sokol & Eisenheim, 2016). 
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Constructing Self-Continuity Across Cultures 
Motivated Identity Construction Theory emphasizes that identity motives can be 
satisfied in different ways across cultures, depending on the context of prevailing beliefs, 
values and practices (Becker et al., 2012, 2014; Vignoles, 2011). We consider here whether 
there are cross-cultural differences in how self-continuity is achieved. Chandler et al. (2003) 
compared how European-heritage and First Nations Canadian adolescents constructed a sense 
of self-continuity. They found that these two cultural groups tended to privilege essentialist or 
narrativist strategies, respectively, illustrating that people living in different socio-cultural 
contexts may emphasize different bases of self-continuity. However, conclusions are limited 
by the bicultural nature of the comparison. Two cultural groups may differ on any number of 
dimensions, and one cannot establish which cultural dimension is responsible for an observed 
difference unless one studies a wide sample of cultural groups (Becker et al., 2012).  
We theorized that constructions of self-continuity should be grounded in beliefs, or 
implicit theories, about personhood (after Chandler et al., 2003; Ross, 1989). Personhood 
beliefs refer to people’s understandings of what it is to be a person, or what it is that defines 
human beings (see Church et al., 2003; Dweck, 2000; Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004; 
Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 2002; Owe et al., 2013). Among these beliefs, mutable (vs. 
immutable) personhood beliefs appear especially relevant to the construction of a sense of 
self-continuity: This dimension opposes an incremental or dynamic theory, which sees 
persons as malleable and able to change over time, with an entity or fixed theory, the belief 
that human beings are stable and immutable entities who cannot change even when they try 
(Dweck, 2000). Indeed, in Chandler and colleagues’ (2003) studies, participants privileging 
an essentialist strategy were more likely to believe in an immutable view of personhood, 
whereas participants favoring a narrativist strategy endorsed a more mutable view. We thus 
expected that mutability beliefs—the belief that human attributes are malleable and able to 
SELF-CONTINUITY ACROSS CULTURES      11 
change—would moderate which bases of self-continuity are used by members of a given 
cultural group. Although few studies have investigated cross-cultural variations of mutable 
(vs. immutable) personhood beliefs, some findings suggest that they are less endorsed in 
Latin American and East-Asian than in North American cultures (Chiu, Dweck, Tong & Fu 
1997; Church et al., 2003, 2005; but see also Chiu, Hong & Dweck 1997; Kashima et al., 
2005; Norenzayan et al., 2002). Notably, when cultural differences in mutability beliefs are 
found, these do not seem to map onto variation in the commonly studied cultural dimension 
of individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995).  
We contrasted mutability beliefs with a second dimension of personhood beliefs: 
contextualized (vs. decontextualized) personhood beliefs (Owe et al., 2013). This dimension 
opposes a contextualized view of personhood—the belief that contextual information, such as 
one’s family, place of origin, social position and group memberships, is important for 
understanding a person—with a decontextualized view of personhood—the belief that 
individuals can be understood in their own terms, without reference to contextual 
information. Thus, where mutable (vs. immutable) personhood beliefs focus on the individual 
in relation to time, contextualized (vs. decontetxualized) personhood beliefs focus on the 
individual in relation to others. Unlike mutability beliefs, contextualism beliefs are viewed as 
a facet of cultural individualism-collectivism, and they are closely related to other indicators 
of this dimension (Owe et al., 2013; Vignoles et al., 2016). Since Chandler et al. (2003) 
claimed that the strategies used to construct a sense of self-continuity are based on mutability 
beliefs, not on individualism-collectivism, we were interested to compare mutability beliefs 
and contextualism beliefs as potential moderators of the bases of self-continuity. 
Motivated Identity Construction Theory predicts that bases of identity motive 
satisfaction will depend not simply on an individual’s personal endorsement of relevant 
beliefs or values, but on the prevailing beliefs and values within their cultural environment 
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(Vignoles, 2011). Constructing an identity is not a lone enterprise, and identity claims must 
be recognized—although not necessarily accepted—by others in order to be believable 
(Swann & Bosson, 2008; Vignoles, in press). Hence, the personhood beliefs of surrounding 
others may be as important as the individual’s own personhood beliefs in determining what 
constitutes a viable sense of self-continuity. Researching two other identity motives, Becker 
et al. (2012, 2014) found that bases of both self-esteem and distinctiveness were moderated 
mainly by culture-level variation in relevant beliefs and values, rather than by individual-
level variation on the same dimensions. Hence, we were interested to test here to what extent 
bases of self-continuity would be moderated by individuals’ personal beliefs about 
personhood and/or by the prevailing cultural climate of such beliefs.  
Research Aims and Hypotheses 
In a major extension of previous research, we conducted a large-scale, cross-cultural 
study aiming to test a culturally contextualized model of self-continuity among adult 
members of a highly diverse set of 55 cultural groups. Our study included semi-literate as 
well as educated participants recruited from rural as well as urban communities across 33 
developed and developing nations spanning all inhabited continents.  
Rather than focus on self-reported individual differences in the construction of self-
continuity, we modeled this as a within-person process that might be moderated by cultural 
and/or individual differences in personhood beliefs. Correspondingly, we used a within-
person methodology to measure the strength of association of self-continuity with each of the 
three bases (illustrated in Figure 1). Each participant listed freely several aspects of his/her 
identity (e.g., “woman”, “musician”, “ambitious”), then rated each identity aspect (1) for the 
extent to which it provided a sense of self-continuity, and (2) for each of the three bases of 
self-continuity, i.e., stability, narrative, and associative links to one’s past. Ratings of 
stability, narrative, and associative links were used to predict within-person variation in the 
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self-continuity ratings. Thus, rather than ask people directly on what they based their sense of 
self-continuity (cf., Chandler et al., 2003), we measured these bases indirectly through 
statistical patterns in their data (Becker et al., 2012, 2014). A notable advantage of this 
technique is that, by focusing on within-person variance (i.e., analyzing patterns in responses 
from each individual to a series of questions), the results are insulated from several common 
sources of methodological bias in cross-cultural research, including the reference-group 
effect (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002) and acquiescent response styles (Smith, 
2004). Such potential effects should not confound our within-person analyses, as they will be 
stable for an individual across his or her ratings of different identity aspects.  
Moreover, our study was designed to test whether cultural and/or personal mutability 
beliefs would moderate the degree to which individuals used stability, narrative, or 
associative links to one’s past in their construction of a sense of self-continuity. Using 
multilevel analyses, we were able to evaluate 1) to what extent living in a specific cultural 
context (i.e., cultural beliefs) predicted differences in the strategies that people use; and 2) to 
what extent personally endorsing specific beliefs predicted such differences. Thus, across 
cultures, we expected that the degree to which people used each of these strategies would 
vary depending on cultural and/or personally endorsed mutable (vs. immutable) personhood 
beliefs. 
Based on the theorizing of Chandler et al. (2003), we hypothesized: 
 
H1:  On average, participants would derive a sense of self-continuity from aspects of their 
identity that made them see themselves as stable (H1a). This tendency would be 
stronger among members of cultural groups with lower mutability beliefs (H1b) 
and/or among participants with lower personal endorsement of mutability beliefs 
(H1c).  
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H2:  On average, participants would derive a sense of self-continuity from aspects of their 
identity that made them think of their lives as a narrative (H2a). This tendency would 
be stronger among members of cultural groups with higher mutability beliefs (H2b) 
and/or among participants with higher personal endorsement of mutability beliefs 
(H2c). 
 
Based on the theorizing of Vignoles et al. (2017), we hypothesized: 
 
H3:  On average, participants would derive a sense of self-continuity from aspects of their 
identity that provided associative links to their past (H3a). This tendency would be 
moderated by cultural group differences in mutability beliefs (H3b) and/or by 
participants’ personal endorsement of mutability beliefs (H3c). 
 
Note that hypotheses H3b and H3c are two-tailed and exploratory, since we had no a priori 
basis to predict how, if at all, the importance of associative links to the past might be related 
to mutable (vs. immutable) personhood beliefs. We included these hypotheses for 
completeness and for consistency with H1 and H2. To assess the specificity of the 
hypothesized effects of mutability beliefs, we also tested in parallel for potential moderating 
effects of contextualized (vs. decontextualized) personhood beliefs (Owe et al., 2013), about 
which we made no specific predictions.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
We included measures in a large multinational study into culture and identity 
processes (see also Owe et al., 2013, Study 2; Vignoles & Brown, 2011, Study 2; Vignoles, 
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Owe et al., 2016, Study 2). Various means were used to recruit convenience samples of adults 
in different locations, including a snowballing technique among the researchers’ social 
networks, through community groups and nongovernmental organizations, and with the help 
of university students who collected data from their relatives.  
We thus sampled and distinguished between diverse cultural groups within each 
nation. A total of 7,287 adults from 55 cultural groups in 33 nations participated in the study. 
The mean age of the overall sample was 35.27 years, and 57% of participants were female. 
Additional descriptive data, including sample size, gender, and age distribution for each 
sample are provided in the online supplement. Sample sizes in our analyses differ slightly 
because of missing data on the variables included in the models.  
Measures 
Collaborators translated the questionnaire from English into the main language of 
each country (see online supplement). Bilinguals unfamiliar with the research topic and 
hypotheses provided independent back-translations. Ambiguities and inconsistencies were 
identified and resolved by discussion, and the translations adjusted.  
Generation of identity aspects. First, we asked participants to generate freely eight 
answers to the question, “Who are you?” (hereafter, identity aspects), using an adapted 
version of the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). This task was at the 
beginning, so that responses would be constrained as little as possible by theoretical 
expectations or demand characteristics. It was printed on a page that folded out to the side of 
the questionnaire, so that participants could see their identity aspects when rating them 
subsequently.  
Researchers have sometimes criticized the Twenty Statements Test for priming an 
individualized, decontextualized, introspective ‘self,’ arguably closer to Western than to other 
cultural conceptions of selfhood (see Smith et al., 2013). Based on discussions with our 
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international collaborators, we produced a culturally de-centered version of this task, 
rewording the original question, “Who am I?” into “Who are you?” and developing a revised 
set of instructions (see Becker et al., 2012, for a similar version):  
 
“In the numbered spaces below, please write down 8 things about yourself. You can 
write your answers as they occur to you without worrying about the order, but 
together they should summarize the image you have of who you are. You can write 
anything you think describes you well. Your answers might include social groups or 
categories you belong to, personal relationships with others, as well as characteristics 
of yourself as an individual. Some may be things that other people know about, others 
may be your private thoughts about yourself. Some things you may see as relatively 
important, and others less so. Some may be things you are relatively happy about, and 
others less so.”  
 
Common answers indeed included individual characteristics (e.g., “intelligent”, “shy”), social 
roles and interpersonal relationships (e.g., “friend”, “pupil”), and social categories (e.g., 
“girl”, “Hungarian”). 
Ratings of identity aspects. Participants subsequently rated each of their freely 
generated identity aspects on various dimensions. Each dimension was presented as a 
question at the top of a new page, with a block of 11-point scales (0 = not at all; 10 = 
extremely) positioned underneath to line up with the identity aspects. One question measured 
the association of each identity aspect with a general sense of self-continuity (“To what extent 
does each of these things make you feel that your past, present, and future are connected?”).  
After some intervening measures, we included items reflecting the three hypothesized 
bases of self-continuity: stability (“To what extent is each of these things stable and 
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unchanging?”), narrative (“How much does each of these things make you think of your life 
as a story?”), and associative links to one’s past (“How much does each of these things 
remind you of your past?”). To avoid carry-over effects, these three items were separated 
from the self-continuity item by several pages of intervening measures and were interspersed 
among several other rating questions, related to another identity motive (distinctiveness).  
Mutable (vs. immutable) personhood beliefs. A scale developed by Levy, 
Stroessner, and Dweck (1998; with items reworded by Bastian & Haslam, 2006) was used to 
measure mutability beliefs. We used six balanced items from the scale, including, for 
example, “You can always substantially change the kind of person you are” and “The kind of 
person you are is something very basic about you and it can’t be changed very much” 
(reversed). Participants rated their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale 
ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 6 (completely agree). We calculated mean individual 
scores (i.e., personal endorsement) and mean for each cultural group (i.e., cultural beliefs) to 
include as moderators in our analyses (overall M = 3.12; SD = 1.01). Both individual (overall 
α = .73) and cultural level (α = .85) reliabilities were good. The mutability belief scores by 
cultural group can be found in the online supplement.  
Contextualized (vs. decontextualized) personhood beliefs. This scale, developed by 
Owe et al. (2013), taps into the beliefs about personhood that are thought to underlie cultural 
collectivism. It measures beliefs about the importance (vs. unimportance) of social and 
contextual attributes in defining a person. The scale consists of six balanced items, including, 
for example, “To understand a person well, it is essential to know about his/her family” and 
“One can understand a person well without knowing about the place he/she comes from” 
(reversed). Participants rated their level of agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale 
ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 6 (completely agree). We calculated mean individual 
scores (i.e., personal endorsement) and mean for each cultural group (i.e., cultural beliefs) to 
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include as moderators in our analyses (overall M = 3.40; SD = 1.02). Both individual (overall 
α = .75) and cultural level (α = .89) reliabilities were good. The contextualism belief scores 
by cultural group can be found in the online supplement. 
Demographic information. Participants indicated their age, gender, country of birth, 
nationality, and several other demographic characteristics.  
Analytical Approach 
Given the nested data structure, we tested predictions of within-person variance in 
sense of self-continuity using multilevel regression analysis (Hox, 2002). Level 1 units were 
identity aspects (N = 54,352), with individuals as Level 2 units (N = 6,915), cultural groups 
as Level 3 units (N = 55), and nations as Level 4 units (N = 33). At Level 1, we modelled 
regression coefficients for within-person predictors of the self-continuity ratings (stability, 
narrative, and associative links). These predictors were centered around participant means, so 
that the within-person effects we were interested in were not confounded with between-
person covariance (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). At Level 2, we modelled regression 
coefficients for individual difference variables (personal beliefs, age, and gender). We 
included gender and age to control for differences in the composition of our samples, but had 
no theoretical basis for predicting differences based on these variables. At Level 3, we 
modelled regression coefficients were for culture-level variables (cultural beliefs). 
Continuous variables at Levels 2 and 3 were centered around their grand means, and a 
contrast code was used for gender (female = -1, male = 1). We used grand-mean centering 
rather than group-mean centering at Level 2 in order to control for the potential confounding 
influence of aggregated individual-level moderations when testing culture-level moderations 
at Level 3 (Firebaugh, 1980; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). We included no predictors at Level 4, 
but we modelled an error term at this level of analysis to account for the clustering of cultural 
groups within nations. Analyses were conducted in MLwiN 2.35 (Rasbash, Browne, Healy, 
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Cameron, & Charlton, 2015), using maximum likelihood estimation with convergence 
criterion of .000001.  
The study included measures of two different types of personhood beliefs: mutability 
beliefs and contextualism beliefs. These two measures showed near-zero correlations at the 
cultural level (r[53] =.03, p = .836) and at the individual level (r[7231] = -.06, p < .001), thus 
confirming their discriminant validity.  
Results 
We computed a series of multilevel regression models predicting self-continuity 
ratings using the three hypothesized bases of self-continuity: stability, narrative, and 
associative links. Descriptives and correlations for these variables are presented in Table 1. 
Regression model parameters are shown in Table 2. We conducted analyses in two steps. 
First, we examined within-person relationships between the three bases of self-continuity and 
the general sense of self-continuity. Model 1 included just these three ratings as Level 1 
predictors. Supporting H1a to H3a, all three bases of self-continuity were significant 
predictors of the self-continuity ratings and had small-to-medium size effects (Betas from .22 
to .34, ps <.001). On average, participants tended to derive greater sense of self-continuity 
from those of their identity aspects that made them see themselves as stable, view their lives 
as a story, and that reminded them of their past. This model accounted for an estimated 
24.04% of within-person variance in self-continuity. 
We added cross-level interaction effects to see whether the weight of self-continuity 
on each of the three bases was significantly moderated by personal and/or cultural beliefs 
about personhood (Model 2). We entered scores of individual-level mutable (vs. immutable) 
and contextualized (vs. decontextualized) personhood beliefs as Level 2 moderators, and 
culture-level mutable (vs. immutable) and contextualized (vs. decontextualized) personhood 
beliefs as Level 3 moderators, of the Level 1 regression weights on the three bases of self-
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continuity. Following Aiken and West (1991), we included the underlying main effects 
alongside these theoretically important interaction effects. We also controlled for age and 
gender of participants as main effects and moderators on Level 2. Compared to Model 1, this 
model provided a significant improvement in fit, χ2(24) = 197.15, p < .001.  
Crucially, significant cross-level interaction effects involving mutability beliefs 
showed a pattern supporting our predictions (see Table 2). Although it did not vary 
significantly with cultural mutability beliefs (H1b), stability was a stronger predictor of self-
continuity among participants endorsing lower mutability beliefs (H1c: B = -.02, p < .001). 
Narrative was a stronger predictor in cultures where people on average endorsed higher 
mutability beliefs (H2b: B = .07, p < .001), although it did not vary by personal endorsement 
of mutability (H2c). Contrary to our exploratory hypotheses H3b and H3c, the extent to 
which participants derived a sense of self-continuity from aspects of their identity that 
reminded them of their past was not moderated significantly by personal nor by cultural 
mutability beliefs.1 
As discussed by McClelland and Judd (1993), it is notoriously difficult to detect 
moderation effects in correlational studies, and even substantively important interactions may 
account for seemingly trivial amounts of variance. To help readers evaluate the substantive 
importance of the effects we found, we have estimated the magnitude of the Level 1 effects at 
upper- and lower-bound values of the mutability belief dimension. We estimated simple 
slopes of the regression of self-continuity on the three bases at extreme values (2 SD below 
and above the mean) of personal endorsement of mutability (1.10; 5.14), and at minimum 
(2.45) and maximum (3.82) values of cultural mutability. As shown in Figure 2, the effect of 
stability was somewhat stronger among individuals with lower mutability beliefs (B = .27, p 
< .001), compared to those with higher mutability beliefs (B = .20, p < .001). In contrast, the 
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effect of narrative was stronger in cultures with the highest mutability beliefs (B = .32, p < 
.001), compared to those with the lowest mutability beliefs (B = .22, p < .001).  
We also found evidence of moderation by personal and cultural contextualism beliefs. 
Stability was a stronger predictor of self-continuity in cultures with higher contextualism 
beliefs (B = .04, p = .009), but a weaker predictor among individuals with higher personal 
endorsement of contextualism beliefs (B = -.01, p = .050). Narrative was a stronger predictor 
of self-continuity in cultures with lower contextualism beliefs (B = -.05, p < .001), whereas 
associative links was a stronger predictor of self-continuity in cultures with higher 
contextualism beliefs (B = .04, p = .002).  
We estimated simple slopes of the regression of self-continuity on the three bases at 
extreme values (2 SD below and above the mean) of personal endorsement of contextualism 
(1.36; 5.44), and at minimum (2.79) and maximum (4.49) values of cultural contextualism. 
As shown in Figure 3, the effect of stability was somewhat stronger in cultures with the 
highest contextualism beliefs (B = .28, p < .001), compared to those with the lowest 
contextualism beliefs (B = .22, p < .001), but somewhat weaker among individuals with 
higher contextualism beliefs (B = .22, p < .001), compared to those with lower contextualism 
beliefs (B = .26, p < .001). The effect of narrative was somewhat weaker in cultures with the 
highest contextualism beliefs (B = .21, p < .001), compared to those with the lowest 
contextualism beliefs (B = .30, p < .001). In contrast, the effect of associative links was 
somewhat stronger in cultures with the highest contextualism beliefs (B = .23, p < .001), 
compared to those with the lowest contextualism beliefs (B = .16, p < .001).  
Discussion 
Patterns in the responses of adult participants from 55 cultural groups in 33 nations, 
supported theoretical predictions that seeing oneself as stable, thinking of one’s life as a story 
(Chandler et al., 2003), and experiencing associative links to one’s past (Vignoles et al., 
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2017) would be alternative ways of constructing a sense of self-continuity. All three bases 
significantly predicted the extent to which participants viewed aspects of their identities as 
connecting their past, present and future (H1a to H3a). Moreover, across the sampled range 
of the moderators in our analyses, the effects of all three bases remained significant. This is a 
first empirical demonstration of how each of the three bases uniquely and robustly predicts 
within-person variation in the sense of self-continuity.  
Our second goal was to test whether and how these bases of self-continuity would 
vary with individual and cultural differences in personhood beliefs. Supporting Chandler and 
colleagues’ (2003) predictions, mutable (vs. immutable) personhood beliefs moderated how 
self-continuity was constructed. Individuals with lower mutability beliefs tended to base their 
sense of self-continuity more on stability (H1b), whereas members of cultures with higher 
mutability beliefs tended to base their sense of self-continuity more on narrative (H2c). These 
findings extend previous support for Motivated Identity Construction Theory regarding the 
cultural flexibility of identity motives (Becker et al., 2012, 2014).  
Notably, these two predicted moderation effects were found at different levels of 
analysis—individual or cultural. Our results showed that participants’ use of stability varied 
with personally endorsed mutability beliefs (while controlling for culture-level differences): 
Individuals who believed more strongly that people cannot change tended to derive a sense of 
self-continuity especially from those of their identity aspects that they perceived as more 
stable. In contrast, participants’ use of narrative varied with culturally normative mutability 
beliefs (i.e., the average beliefs within a cultural group, while controlling for individual-level 
differences): Members of cultural groups in which it was believed more strongly on average 
that people can change tended to derive a sense of self-continuity more from those of their 
identity aspects that made them think of their lives as a story.  
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These moderation effects at different levels of analysis require different levels of 
explanation, consistent with viewing identities as constructed through a complex interplay of 
psychological processes and sociocultural practices (Vignoles, in press). Basing one’s self-
continuity on stability seemingly depends on intrapsychic processes, since the association of 
self-continuity with stability is stronger to the extent that the individual holds a 
correspondingly immutable view of personhood, regardless of the beliefs that prevail in her 
cultural context. In contrast, basing one’s self-continuity on narrative seemingly depends to a 
greater extent on cultural practices, since this association is stronger to the extent that the 
individual’s cultural group holds a correspondingly mutable view of personhood, regardless 
of the individual’s own personhood beliefs. Constructing narratives is a profoundly social 
process—stories have to be told, and thus shared, before they can be internalized (Gergen & 
Gergen, 1988). Hence, it would be the sociocultural practice of “storytelling”, rather than an 
intrapsychic process, that allows people to derive self-continuity from parts of themselves 
that make them think of their lives as stories (Hammack, 2008).  
Contextualism beliefs also moderated the ways in which self-continuity was 
constructed. These moderations, mainly situated at the cultural level, showed that members of 
groups with a more contextualized view of personhood associated self-continuity more 
strongly with stability and associative links to one’s past, whereas members of groups with a 
more decontextualized view of personhood associated self-continuity more strongly with 
narrative.2 These findings were not predicted a priori, and they would benefit from 
replication. Nonetheless, one possible—albeit speculative—interpretation focuses on 
individualism-collectivism, the cultural dimension of which contextualism beliefs are one 
facet (Owe et al., 2013; Vignoles et al., 2016). Individualist societies have been associated 
with higher residential mobility (Oishi & Kisling, 2009), relational mobility (Yuki & Schug, 
2012), divorce rates (Lester, 1995), and arguably mid-life career changes (Sullivan & Arthur, 
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2006). Thus, one’s place of residence, core personal relationships, and occupation—all of 
which are likely to be major sources of day-to-day continuity for many people—tend to be 
more changeable over the long term in individualist societies (where decontextualized 
personhood beliefs prevail) than in collectivist societies (where contextualized personhood 
beliefs prevail). Perhaps, then, the changeability of these important domains of identity may 
somewhat reduce the viability of basing one’s sense of self-continuity on stability over the 
long term, whereas it would make the need for a personal narrative more pressing.   
We should note several limitations of the current study. First, our findings are based 
on cross-sectional data, and so we cannot be certain about causal directions. Longitudinal and 
experimental research would help to untangle the underlying causal relationships. Second, 
our focus on identity aspects as discrete units of analysis means that our dependent variable 
potentially does not provide a full account of self-continuity. Indeed, one important part of 
establishing self-continuity may be the forming of a coherent sense of self that ties together 
different identity aspects, rather than applying to each of them separately. Third, our focus on 
associative links to the past as a source of self-continuity may have missed the potential value 
for self-continuity of associative links to one’s expected future—for example, through 
identifying with objects that symbolize cherished life goals or aspirations. Fourth, our 
unpredicted findings of how contextualism beliefs moderated the use of bases of self-
continuity, and the speculative interpretations that we offer here, require replicating and 
testing in future research. Last, we have focused here on predicting individual and cultural 
differences in the tendency to rely on each of the three bases. An interesting direction for 
future research would be to investigate how these bases are dynamically related: For 
example, if their sense of stability is undermined through life events or experimental 
interventions, then people may turn to narrative or to associative links in order to restore self-
continuity (Sedikides et al., 2015).  
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To conclude, the current study demonstrates the importance of attending to the 
multifaceted nature of self-continuity. This can be based on seeing oneself as stable or on 
creating a narrative (as theorized by Chandler et al., 2003), which rely on explicit reasoning. 
However, it can also be based on experiencing associative links to one’s past (as theorized by 
Vignoles et al., 2016), where self-continuity is felt at a more implicit level. Finally, cultural 
context should be taken into account when investigating people’s strivings for self-continuity, 
as these may express themselves in different ways depending on individual, but also cultural 
beliefs about personhood. Understanding better the diverse and flexible ways that individuals 
can use to construct a sense of self-continuity, as well as the individual and cultural factors 
predicting their use, will help researchers to understand and practitioners to ameliorate the 
negative personal and social consequences that can occur when self-continuity strivings are 
frustrated or go awry (Ball & Chandler, 1989; Lampinen et al., 2004; Rosenberg, 1986; 
Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). 
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Footnotes 
1 Similar estimates for the moderation effects of mutable (vs. immutable) personhood 
beliefs were found in a model without controls for contextualism beliefs, gender and age. 
2 This pattern of findings would not offer an alternative explanation of the differences 
observed by Chandler et al. (2003) between First Nations and European-heritage Canadians, 
where the former relied more on narrative and the latter on stability. Here, stability was a 
stronger basis for continuity not only in cultural groups with more contextualized personhood 
beliefs, but also among individuals with more decontextualized personhood beliefs. Although 
it is intriguing to find opposing effects at two different levels of analysis, the individual-level 
moderation especially should not be over-interpreted, considering that it only very narrowly 
reached statistical significance at the conventional .05 level. 
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Table 1. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations between Ratings of Identity 
Aspects (listwise N = 54,352) for Self-Continuity, Stability, Narrative, and Associative Links.  
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Self-Continuity 7.36 2.61 – .39 .44 .47 
2. Stability 7.63 2.43 .37 – .27 .30 
3. Narrative 6.57 2.94 .41 .27 – .43 
4. Associative links 6.73 2.94 .40 .27 .37 – 
Note. Values below diagonal use raw ratings, and values above diagonal use participant 
mean-centered values. All coefficients are significant at p < .001.  
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Table 2.  
Estimated Parameters of Multilevel Regression Predicting Self-Continuity Ratings.  
  Model 1  Model 2 
 B SE p  β  B SE p β 
Within-participants main effects (Level 1: N = 54,352 identity aspects)          
  Stability [H1a] .239 .004 <.001 .226  .238 .005 <.001 .226 
  Narrative [H2a] .269 .004 <.001 .260  .270 .005 <.001 .260 
  Associative links to one’s past [H3a] .186 .004 <.001 .198  .187 .004 <.001 .198 
          
Individual-level main effects (Level 2: N = 6,915 individuals)          
  Personal mutability beliefs      -.016 .023 .472 -.009 
  Personal contextualism beliefs      .030 .022 .180 .017 
  Age      .075 .018 <.001 .055 
  Gender      -.101 .022 <.001 -.027 
          
Culture-level main effects (Level 3: N = 55 cultural groups)          
  Cultural mutability beliefs      .006 .190 .976 .004 
  Cultural contextualism beliefs      .580 .210 .006 .366 
          
Individual-level moderators of within-participants slopes          
  Personal mutability beliefs x stability [H1b]      -.018 .005 <.001 -.017 
  Personal mutability beliefs x narrative [H2b]      .003 .004 .529 -.003 
  Personal mutability beliefs x associative links to one’s past [H3b]      -.005 .004 .211 -.005 
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  Model 1  Model 2 
 B SE p  β  B SE p β 
  Personal contextualism beliefs x stability      -.009 .004 .050 -.009 
  Personal contextualism beliefs x narrative      .003 .004 .535 .003 
  Personal contextualism beliefs x associative links to one’s past      -.007 .004 .084 -.007 
  Age x stability      .012 .004 .001 .015 
  Age x narrative      .017 .004 <.001 .022 
  Age x associative links to one’s past      -.003 .003 .237 -.004 
  Gender x stability      -.013 .005 .003 -.006 
  Gender x narrative      -.013 .005 .004 -.006 
  Gender x associative links to one’s past      .008 .004 .039 .004 
          
Culture-level moderators of within-participants slopes          
  Cultural mutability beliefs x stability [H1c]      .006 .013 .617 .002 
  Cultural mutability beliefs x narrative [H2c]      .070 .013 <.001 .024 
  Cultural mutability beliefs x associative links to one’s past [H3c]      -.007 .012 .569 -.003 
  Cultural contextualism beliefs x stability      .036 .014 .009 .012 
  Cultural contextualism beliefs x narrative      -.054 .014 <.001 -.018 
  Cultural contextualism beliefs x associative links to one’s past      .040 .013 .002 .014 
          
Residual variance          
  Within-participant level 3.013 .020 <.001   3.003 .020 <.001  
  Individual level 2.741 .053 <.001   2.724 .053 <.001  
  Culture level .085 .033 .011   .055 .024 .024  
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  Model 1  Model 2 
 B SE p  β  B SE p β 
  National level .152 .059 .010   .158 .054 .004  
Deviance  228,785    228,588  
Note. Gender was contrast coded as female = -1, male = 1; age was in units of 10 years. Values of β were derived from B weights by multiplying 
by the standard deviation of the predictor and dividing by the standard deviation of the outcome (Hox, 2002); because between-participant 
variance was excluded from level 1 predictors by within-participant centering, we used within-participant standard deviations for the outcome 
and level 1 predictors in level 1 main effects and cross-level interaction effects; for main effects at level 2 and 3, we used between-participant 
and between-culture standard deviations respectively; for cross-level interactions, we multiplied by the standard deviation of both interacting 
predictors at their respective levels of analysis. 
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Figure 1. 
Illustrative examples of identity aspects and their ratings from one Ghanaian and one British 
participant.  
Note. Here, Participant A (left) shows a strong positive correlation between the extent to 
which an aspect of identity is perceived as stable and unchanging (top) and the sense of self-
continuity provided by that aspect. A weaker correlation appears between the extent to which 
his identity aspects make him think of his life as a story (bottom) and the sense of self-
continuity. This indicates that the sense of self-continuity of Participant A is based more on 
stability, and less on narrative. Participant B (right) shows a very different profile and seems 
to base his sense of self-continuity more on narrative, and less on stability. 
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Figure 2. 
Stability, narrative, and associative links as predictors of sense of self-continuity, depending on personal endorsement of mutability beliefs 
(Panel A) and on cultural mutability beliefs (Panel B).  
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Figure 3. 
Stability, narrative, and associative links as predictors of sense of self-continuity, depending on personal endorsement of contextualism beliefs 
(Panel A) and on cultural contextualism beliefs (Panel B).
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Online appendix 
Demographic Details for Each Cultural Sample. 
Cultural 
group 
N M age Age 
min 
Age 
max 
SD  
age 
% 
fem. 
M mutable 
(vs. 
immutable) 
beliefs 
SD mutable 
(vs. 
immutable) 
beliefs 
M contextualized 
(vs. 
decontextualized) 
beliefs 
SD 
contextualized 
(vs. 
decontextualized) 
beliefs 
Language City/region 
   Belgium 
High SES 
185 43.78 27 61 8.15 48 2.69 .94 3.04 1.05 French French speaking 
Belgium  
   Belgium 
Low SES 
178 28.57 18 54 9.23 47 2.94 .96 2.94 1.19 French Wallonia 
   Brazil 
Central 
185 33.60 18 77 13.74 44 3.61 1.04 3.70 1.06 Portuguese Goiânia 
   Brazil 
North East 
150 38.95 20 67 11.62 73 3.53 1.03 3.51 1.06 Portuguese João Pessoa 
   Brazil 
South 
165 25.97 16 59 9.65 56 3.45 .89 3.48 1.05 Portuguese Porto Alegre 
   Cameroon 
Bafut 
100 26.07 19 45 6.07 67 3.47 .76 3.15 .87 English North West 
   Chile 
Majority 
149 44.97 22 77 12.42 58 3.12 1.12 3.07 .96 Spanish Mainly Santiago 
Metropolitan Region 
   Chile 
Mapuche 
150 38.16 18 72 14.79 55 3.01 1.00 3.35 1.21 Spanish Temuco, La 
Araucanía Region 
   China East 124 31.58 18 70 8.24 69 2.68 .72 4.05 .84 Chinese Beijing 
   China 
West 
135 31.15 18 60 8.67 68 2.88 .69 3.65 .85 Chinese Sichuan 
   Colombia 
rural 
149 35.21 18 69 13.37 62 3.19 .85 3.20 1.00 Spanish San Martín, Meta and 
Villavicencio, Meta 
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Cultural 
group 
N M age Age 
min 
Age 
max 
SD  
age 
% 
fem. 
M mutable 
(vs. 
immutable) 
beliefs 
SD mutable 
(vs. 
immutable) 
beliefs 
M contextualized 
(vs. 
decontextualized) 
beliefs 
SD 
contextualized 
(vs. 
decontextualized) 
beliefs 
Language City/region 
   Colombia 
urban 
150 38.72 19 68 11.48 60 3.29 1.06 3.14 1.20 Spanish Bogota 
   Egypt 164 31.12 19 65 9.95 52 2.88 1.08 3.45 .93 Arabic Cairo and greater 
Cairo area 
   Ethiopia 
highlanders 
150 33.11 20 72 9.21 38 3.02 1.05 4.49 .99 Amharic Oromiya 
   Ethiopia 
urban 
150 35.02 20 65 8.97 46 3.51 1.02 3.95 .97 Amharic Addis Ababa 
   Georgia 
Baptists 
81 44.85 18 85 17.17 75 3.50 .93 3.39 1.11 Georgian Tbilisi 
   Georgia 
Orthodox 
138 39.16 18 69 12.04 45 2.45 1.04 3.65 .98 Georgian Tbilisi 
   Germany 
East 
153 40.26 18 74 14.68 58 2.71 .83 3.35 .96 German All over East 
Germany 
   Germany 
West 
104 39.71 16 79 15.67 58 2.85 .91 3.36 1.02 German All over West 
Germany 
   Ghana 
Ashanti 
116 28.58 16 44 5.06 23 3.33 .71 3.19 .91 English Kumasi Regional 
Capital 
   Hungary 
Majority 
151 36.83 19 85 12.74 46 3.11 1.01 3.40 1.00 Hungarian Budapest 
   Hungary 
Roma 
92 33.37 17 65 11.65 48 3.32 .89 3.17 .90 Hungarian Various 
   Iceland 124 35.19 20 67 13.25 67 3.55 .82 3.15 .86 Icelandic Greater Reykjavík 
area 
   Italy rural 90 40.30 18 67 13.62 72 2.94 1.05 3.39 .92 Italian mainly Lombardy 
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Cultural 
group 
N M age Age 
min 
Age 
max 
SD  
age 
% 
fem. 
M mutable 
(vs. 
immutable) 
beliefs 
SD mutable 
(vs. 
immutable) 
beliefs 
M contextualized 
(vs. 
decontextualized) 
beliefs 
SD 
contextualized 
(vs. 
decontextualized) 
beliefs 
Language City/region 
   Italy urban 83 37.59 18 66 12.35 69 3.04 1.03 3.57 1.01 Italian mainly Lombardy 
   Japan 
Hokkaido 
73 50.87 25 82 12.42 63 2.78 .80 3.05 .81 Japanese Sapporo 
   Japan 
Mainland 
211 41.43 18 81 15.47 60 2.87 .77 3.02 .81 Japanese Kansai-area and 
Kanto-area 
   Lebanon E 
Beirut  
140 35.45 17 80 13.32 52 2.57 1.06 3.08 .99 Arabic East Beirut 
   Lebanon 
W Beirut  
124 34.72 17 83 14.74 41 2.52 .96 3.47 1.05 Arabic West Beirut 
   Malaysia 150 28.05 20 60 7.90 63 3.48 .60 3.79 .74 Malay Kuala Lumpur 
   Namibia 
Damara 
69 25.14 19 43 6.36 61 3.39 .90 2.91 1.08 English Windhoek 
   Namibia 
Owambo 
135 24.34 19 49 5.29 68 3.71 .78 2.91 1.01 English Windhoek 
   New 
Zealand 
Pakeha 
204 34.91 17 80 13.03 49 3.54 .94 3.39 .88 English Wellington 
   Norway 102 37.01 19 65 13.47 57 3.39 1.16 2.79 .85 Norwegian East-Norway 
   Oman 160 25.21 14 42 4.97 45 3.53 1.16 3.36 .93 Arabic Various regions 
   Peru rural 73 41.31 18 72 13.38 62 3.28 .85 3.75 1.08 Spanish Catalina (Chepén) 
   Peru urban 81 30.65 18 62 14.56 52 3.21 .94 3.35 .80 Spanish Lima 
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Cultural 
group 
N M age Age 
min 
Age 
max 
SD  
age 
% 
fem. 
M mutable 
(vs. 
immutable) 
beliefs 
SD mutable 
(vs. 
immutable) 
beliefs 
M contextualized 
(vs. 
decontextualized) 
beliefs 
SD 
contextualized 
(vs. 
decontextualized) 
beliefs 
Language City/region 
   
Philippines 
Christian 
152 32.01 18 76 12.19 51 3.50 .85 4.05 .87 English/Tausug Manila, Iloilo, Sulu 
   
Philippines 
Muslim 
154 24.97 18 63 8.79 50 3.60 .62 3.93 .80 English/Tausug Sulu 
   Romania 
rural 
162 37.02 14 85 15.00 59 2.77 .93 3.26 .99 Romanian West Region of 
Romania 
   Romania 
urban 
314 35.17 19 73 12.14 56 2.55 .97 3.21 1.04 Romanian The West Region of 
Romania 
   Russia 
Caucasians 
140 32.26 13 60 11.91 81 3.15 .84 3.15 .91 Russian Chechnya Republic, 
Ingishetiya Republic, 
Stavropool province, 
Stavropool city, 
Nazran (town), 
Grozniy city, 
Malocbec town 
   Russia 
Russians 
122 29.43 17 64 12.29 76 2.82 .99 3.26 .84 Russian Moscow  
   Singapore 110 34.95 20 60 12.69 54 3.30 .91 3.73 .84 English Singapore 
   Spain rural 75 38.61 20 91 16.04 47 2.90 .97 3.36 1.13 Spanish La Herradura, 
Granada, and La 
Puebla de Montalbán, 
Toledo 
   Spain 
urban 
105 41.16 20 68 13.34 55 3.00 1.00 3.43 1.08 Spanish Madrid 
   Sweden 101 45.18 19 90 15.94 65 3.50 1.08 3.11 1.05 Swedish All over Sweden 
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Cultural 
group 
N M age Age 
min 
Age 
max 
SD  
age 
% 
fem. 
M mutable 
(vs. 
immutable) 
beliefs 
SD mutable 
(vs. 
immutable) 
beliefs 
M contextualized 
(vs. 
decontextualized) 
beliefs 
SD 
contextualized 
(vs. 
decontextualized) 
beliefs 
Language City/region 
   Thailand 71 27.99 20 52 6.66 69 2.85 .84 3.92 .74 Thai Bangkok 
   Turkey 
Alevi 
114 38.88 20 68 10.97 64 2.61 .88 3.49 .85 Turkish Ankara 
   Turkey 
Majority 
134 40.62 18 71 9.91 57 2.56 .97 3.60 .91 Turkish Bursa 
   Uganda 
Baganda 
153 34.39 16 55 6.28 58 3.56 .56 3.58 .66 English Kampala, Central 
region 
   UK rural 95 51.82 18 81 16.08 72 3.11 1.02 3.21 .93 English All over Great Britain 
   UK urban 133 43.92 18 90 17.38 62 3.14 1.02 3.12 .89 English All over Great Britain 
   US 
Colorado 
92 37.07 19 70 13.98 59 3.82 1.13 3.37 .94 English Colorado Springs 
   US 
Hispanics 
122 27.57 18 67 11.04 71 3.42 1.06 3.83 .96 Spanish Miami 
Total 
7287 35.27 13 91 13.40 57 3.12 1.01 3.40 1.02   
 
